In our everyday world, we typically have an expectancy as to the kinds of scenes that we will see from one glance to the next. Also, many of the scenes that we do see are familiar in the sense that they have been experienced before. Do these factors influence the perception of a scene? In three experiments, priming subjects with a verbal descriptor of a scene was not found to improve reliably the perception of that scene as assessed by the speed and accuracy of detecting an incongruity between an object and its setting (Experiments 1 and 2) or a specified target object (Experiment 3). Also, in attempting to perceive these scenes, subjects could not capitalize on the residue from prior exposures of a scene's background, even though those backgrounds had been processed to the point where semantic information had been extracted from them. Although these results are inconsistent with recent speculations on the role of frames in scene perception, they are compatible with the literature of the effects of set on perception, recent experiments on the perception of a scene from a single fixation, and film-editing practice with "flash cuts." The implications of these results are that the mechanisms for perceiving and interpreting nondegraded real-world scenes are so quick and efficient that conditions can readily be found in which priming and prior exposures of substantial portions of scenes are not helpful for perceiving and judging certain aspects of those scenes.
capacity, appeal has often been made to prior expectancy and familiarity as two factors that could reduce the range of possible scenes before the eye actually fixates at one (Bruner, 1957; Brunswik, 1956; Minsky, 1975) .
There is typically a degree of predictability (or expectancy) 1 from one glance to the next in the visual world. One expects to see a room of some kind when entering a house for the first time-not a Burger King. We tested whether such predictability actually affects the processing of information from a scene. That is, if prior to viewing a scene a subject is primed by being told that the scene will be a kitchen, will the perception of a kitchen be faster and more accurate than if such a prime ' A distinction between two uses of the term expectancy should be made: (a) the hypothesis about the general setting or topic of a scene that could exist prior to its viewing and (b) the use of specific constraints,or semantic relations during the viewing of a scene as sensory information is assimilated. Our use here is confined to the former, hence the qualification "prior" in the first paragraph. It is, of course, possible that expectancy (a) could affect expectancy (b). Our results show that this is not the case.
is not provided? The theoretical issue under scrutiny concerns the structure-the schema or "frame" (Minsky, 1975) -that integrates the scene and allows access to world knowledge about it. Do generic levels of representation exist that, if activated in advance, facilitate perception? Minsky (1975) answers this question in the affirmative:
Visual experience seems continuous. ... A deeper explanation is that our expectations usually interact smoothly with our perceptions.. . . Just before you enter a room, you usually know enough to expect a room rather than, say, a landscape. You can usually tell just by the character of the door. And you can often select in advance a frame for the new room. Very often, one expects a certain particular room. Then many assignments are already filled in. (p. 221)
Minsky's depiction of scene perception certainly has intuitive appeal. We can imagine the enormous computational problem faced by the visual system in attempting to decipher something as complex as a scene. Preexisting stereotyped structures for the resolution of this complexity could be of extraordinary value. Thus Friedman (1979) thought it helpful to prime her subjects with the name of the setting (e.g., kitchen) prior to a 30-sec exposure of a picture representing that setting. Bruner and Potter's (1964) experiment is often cited as providing experimental support for the idea that a prior expectation of a scene could influence its perception. In the Bruner and Potter experiment, the expectations, or hypotheses, were interfering. They found that if one viewed a scene that was maximally blurred, then that scene would have to be brought into greater clarity of focus before it could be perceived accurately compared with a scene that had been initially viewed at only a moderate degree of blur. Presumably, incorrect hypotheses elicited with the extreme blurs interfered with the elicitation of the correct frame.
With respect to familiarity, it is the case that often, but not always, we have previously experienced the scenes that we experience in our everyday lives. Can our perception capitalize on this experience? Again, Minsky (1975) seemed to answer this question in the affirmative: "If the new room is unfamiliar, no preassembled frame can supply fine details; more scene analysis is needed" (p. 223).
In contrast to Minsky's speculations on the value of expectancy and familiarity, however, stands current film-editing practice-the use of "flash cuts." A flash cut is a splice of a short segment of a film, representing a time and place other than that of the main narrative and introduced into the film without prior cues. In commercial motion pictures these were first used in "The Pawnbroker" (Lumet, 1965) , edited by Ralph Rosenbloom. Until that film, motion picture flashbacks were typically cued by narrative and visual "dissolves" to suggest the transition from present to past events. But according to Rosenbloom, director Sidney Lumet was trying to take the process (of memory flashbacks) a step further.. . . And so he took a stab at suggesting the onslaught of memory by using flashcuts. . . . How long should an initial flash last in order to suggest the percolation of memory? Eight frames, a third of a second, seemed (incredibly) to linger too long. (Italics ours; Rosenbloom & Karen, 1979, p. 153) Flash cuts are only the extreme example of the film editor's pragmatic faith that audiences can quickly comprehend unfamiliar scenes. In any motion picture or television program, hundreds of sudden transitions from one setting to another are made. The subjective experience is that the new settings are comprehended as rapidly as different shots within the same setting, where we have had an opportunity to benefit from familiarity and expectancy.
The preceding account of subjective experience and film-editing lore is compatible with the results of experiments reporting a rapid comprehension of a scene from a single glance (Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass, & Stacy, 1974; Intraub, 1981; Potter, 1975 Potter, , 1976 ). If we can see and comprehend an unfamiliar scene at a glance, then perhaps there is not much opportunity for prior expectancy and familiarity to yield a benefit. These arguments do not preclude the possibility that familiarity or priming has a beneficial effect on scene perception. They do, however, render such effects less plausible.
Three experiments are reported in this article. In all experiments subjects viewed briefly presented pictures of line drawings of real-world scenes in which an object was 
Interposition
The background appears to pass through the object.
Position
The object is likely to occur in the scene but not at that particular location.
Probability
The object is unlikely to occur in that setting.
Size
The object is too large or too small relative to the other objects in the scene.
a floating fire hydrant a car in the background appearing to pass through the hydrant the hydrant on top of a mailbox the hydrant in a kitchen the hydrant appearing larger than a truck cued. On half the presentations the cued object was in an incongruous relation to its background. In Experiments 1 and 2 subjects attempted to judge whether a semantic incongruity existed between the object (which was specified in advance) and its setting (e.g., a fire hydrant on a mailbox in a street scene). In Experiment 3 subjects attempted to verify whether a given target object was present in a cued position in the scene. In all experiments, the effects of expectancy for the setting was studied by priming the setting with a verbal descriptor prior to its presentation.
Familiarity was studied by repetition of the background.
Experiment 1 In this experiment, subjects were required to judge whether an incongruity existed in the relationship between some specified target object and its precued location in a scene. The incongruities were produced by violating three (Support, Position, or Size) of the five relations listed and described in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 1 to 5 . These five relations are sufficient to characterize much of the difference between a well-formed realworld scene and a display of unrelated objects (Biederman, 1981) .
The first two relations in Table 1 , Support and Interposition, are termed physical because one can determine whether an object is floating in air or whether the background is passing through it without knowing what the object is. (However, if objects that can normally be unsupported, such as birds or balls, are included, then the determination of Support violation as a violation does require access to the identity of the object. Such objects were not included in any of these ex- periments.) The latter three relations, Probability, Position, and Size, are designated as semantic because they require access to the referential meaning of the context.
A priori, the detection of a Probability violation requires that the referential meaning of the setting be determined along with the semantic appropriatenesss of the object in that setting. In addition to the identification of the setting, the Size relation requires that the object's apparent position in depth also be determined. Position imposes an addi- tional requirement to those imposed by the Probability and Size relations: the determination of the semantic appropriateness of the specific interaction between an object and its setting. Thus, on a priori grounds, judgments of Position violations impose the most stringent requirements for comprehending a scene, and the successful detection of Position violations can provide an operational definition of the semantic access of a scene (Biederman et al., 1982) . Empirically, however, the evidence is that access to the Position relation occurs simultaneously with the other relations and that the Support relation may be a special case of the Position relation (Biederman et al., 1982) . That is, an object's semantic relations to its setting are accessed simultaneously with its physical relations and its own identity. The successful judgment of these relations thus provides evidence that the scenes were processed to a semantic level.
2
The present investigation posed the question about perceptual access to the memory of a scene in the following way: Suppose on Trial 10 a scene was viewed for a period of time that was too brief (100 msec) to allow a second fixation but long enough for the scene to be comprehended (as measured by the detection of semantic incongruities among the entities of the scene). Now, if that setting was presented again on Trial 26, 16 scenes and a few minutes later, again on Trial 56, and again on Trial 80, would its perceptibility be increased 'as a function of its prior presentations?
The violation-detection task studied in this experiment (and in Experiment 2) required that the background be perceived. If priming or repetition of the background were to facilitate the perception of that background (or any other stage for that matter), then the overall level of performance on the task should be facilitated. The absence of an effect of priming or repetitions would indicate that these variables did not affect the perception of the background (or anything else). Positive results would document the use of prior expectancies or familiarity in the performance of the task but leave unresolved the locus of the effects, because an effect of either of the two variables could arise from any of a number of stages subsequent to the perceptual processing of the background, for example, a later judgment stage.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 72 native-English-speaking students at the State University of New York at Buffalo who participated in the experiment as part of their introductory psychology course requirement. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Scenes. Each of the scenes was composed by superimposing a clear acetate sheet, with an object or creature drawn on it (1 of 96), over 1 of 28 background settings. The backgrounds were of a variety of different real-world settings, such as a kitchen, interstate highway, living room, downtown city street, bathroom sink, office, farm, 'and so on. Three hundred scenes (an object plus background) were composed. In half the scenes, the target object was in a normal relation to its setting; in the other half, the object was displaced to various sections of the background or placed in other scenes to violate one or two of the five relations listed in Table 1 .
The 150 slides in which a violation was present were equally distributed over five violation conditions. In three of these conditions, the target object underwent a single violation of Size, Position, or Support. In the remaining two conditions, the target object violated two relations, Size and Position in one condition and Size and Support in the other. A given object could appear in from one to four violation conditions, but they all appeared once in a base location.
Probability violations were not studied in the violation-detection experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) because subjects would have been able to infer that a Probability violation was present merely from the scene prime, for example, Kitchen, and the target name, Canoe, without even looking at the scene. Also, Interposition was not studied because previous experiments (Biederman et al., 1982) had established that violations of that relation could not be readily detected from a brief exposure. (Probability and Interposition violations were used in Experiment 3.) Figures 1 to '5 show examples of the single-violation conditions that were used in these experiments.
Design and procedure. The first 48 subjects were alternately assigned to one of two groups: the verbal prime (VP) group or a no-prime (NP) control group. When no difference was found between these two groups, an additional 24 subjects were run in an imagery prime (IP) group in an attempt to find instuctional procedures that might produce a priming effect.
From a deck of cards, subjects read the name of an object only (NP condition), or they read the name of an object and the name of the scene (VP and IP conditions).
For example, subjects in the VP and IP conditions would read SCENE: living room; TARGET: book. They were told that the scene that was to be presented would always correspond to the scene label and that the cued object would always correspond to the target label. Subjects in the NP group had similar instructions except that they were provided only with the target label. The target and primes (scene labels) were read aloud by the subject, and, when ready, he or she would press a key to initiate a sequence of three projectors fitted with shutters controlled by an Automated Data Systems 1800E computer. The only difference in procedure between the IP and VP primed conditions was that subjects in the IP condition were instructed, after reading the scene and target names, "to take a moment to imagine what such a scene described by the label might look like."
On the screen in front of the subject, a cue (dot) would be presented for 500 msec, followed by a 100-msec flash of a scene, which was, in turn, followed by 500-insec presentation of a mask (a composite of object parts and lines appearing randomly). The cue always designated the position in the scene where the target object would appear. Therefore, the subjects knew where to look, what object they were to judge, and, in the priming groups, what kind of setting was to be shown. The subject's task was to decide whether this object was in an anomalous relation to its context, that is, whether it was floating in air, was too small or too large, or was in an unlikely position. Subjects responded by pressing one of two microswitches: one marked bad for a violation, the other marked good for a normal relation. The subjects were fully informed as to the nature of the violations and the scenes and were allowed as many practice trials as they desired on a set of scenes not used in the experiment proper. All subjects readily understood the task.
To distinguish general-learning effects (e.g., learning the assignment of responses to keys) from faster memorial access of specific backgrounds, the experimental scenes were split into two sets, with half of the 28 backgrounds in one set and the remaining backgrounds in the other. No 2 backgrounds within the same set had the same label. A given subject would view the scenes from one set with each background presented five times for the first half of the experiment. The subject would view the other set of backgrounds only in the second half of the experiment. Half the subjects in each of the groups viewed one set first; the remaining subjects viewed the other set first. Given that learning did occur over the five presentations of the background in the first half, if what was learned was not specific to the scene but general to the task, then this learning should transfer to performance with the second set of backgrounds; that is, savings should be evidenced. If, however, faster or better access of the specific scene backgrounds was learned with the first set, then the performance gains of the first half should not show complete transfer to the second half; that is, savings should not be evidenced.
Each set of scenes was divided into five blocks, each containing scenes from all 14 backgrounds. The mean separation (lag) between successive exposures of a background was 10.5 trials (range 2 to 63). The order of viewing the five blocks within each set was balanced by a Latin square across subjects. In addition, half the sub- jects viewed the slides in forward order; the other half, in backward order. Therefore, all slides had the same mean serial position.
In this experiment, a subject never saw the identical slide twice. At least two different objects were judged for each background (M = 2.3). When the same object appeared in a given scene background, it was never in the same location as it had been on a previous trial. Each object appeared at least twice: one in a normal (base) relation to its background and at least once in one of the violation conditions. The sequence of correct responses (bad vs. good) over the five exposures of a given scene was in a randomly generated order as were the kinds of violations that could be present. Thus, when a given background setting was repeated after being presented on an earlier trial, the subject would have an approximate .5 probability of judging an object different from the one that was the target previously for that scene and an approximate .5 probability of making a different response. If on successive repetitions of a scene targets were undergoing violations, the violations generally differed. The positions of the cues also differed. Thus, on Trial 20 a city street-corner scene might be presented with a fire hydrant on top of a mailbox as the target. When the scene was presented 15 trials later, the hydrant would be gone, the target object might be a truck, and the truck might be in a normal position (cued in the street) or of inappropriate size. This was done to eliminate the benefit of specific target-to-response association strategies that could circumvent semantic processing of the scenes. Interspersed among the experimental scenes were six filler scenes that provided additional base objects to equalize the response probabilities.
The scenes subtended a visual angle of approximately 11°. This angle was sufficiently small so that even though only a specific location of the scene was precued, the general setting was readily comprehensible.
Results
Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage of errors and mean correct response times (RTs) for the experimental groups over the course of the experiment. On the first block of trials, performance was well above chance for the Position relation. Thus, the scenes were processed to a semantic level.
Repetition. As scene backgrounds were repeated, subjects were faster and more accurate at detecting the presence (or absence) of a violation between an object and the background, F(4, 276) = 16.20, p < .001, for RTs, and F(4, 276) = 3.52, p < .01, for errors. However, it is clear from Figures 6 and 7 that this learning over the first half of the experiment was not due to the repetition of these specific scene backgrounds: When a completely different set of backgrounds was introduced in the second half of the experiment, the benefits of learning transferred completely to those new scenes. We therefore conclude that all the learning from the repetitions in the first half of the experiment was due to nonspecific transfer. Whatever subjects were doing to process the semantic relations between an object and its background was insufficient to facilitate the processing of a subsequent exposure of that background.
Priming. Although the IP group had consistently shorter RTs and a lower error rate than the NP group, we are reluctant to reject the null hypothesis-that priming had no beneficial effect-for three reasons. First, the analysis of variance test for the differences among the three priming conditions was not close to being significant, F(2,69) = 1.79 and .40, for errors and RTs, respectively. Second, not only were more sensitive within-subject tests of priming in Experiment 2 also not significant, but in Experiment 3 the direction of the effect favored the NP conditions. Third, if there was a true beneficial effect of priming, it should have increased with repetitions of the backgrounds. For the very first exposure of a kitchen, being primed with the word kitchen should not be nearly as helpful as being so primed when the kitchen has been viewed for four prior exposures. Yet the pattern of these results was in the opposite direction for RTs and showed no interaction over exposures for errors. That is, in the first half of the experiment, there was a large effect of priming on RTs for the very first exposure. But as the scene backgrounds were repeated, the benefits of priming were reduced. Our conclusion is that differences among the priming groups in this experiment were: a consequence of subject sampling.
The effects of priming on the various violation conditions in this experiment are described in the Results section of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2

Method
Thirty-six subjects participated in this experiment. The major design difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was that in the present experiment priming was manipulated as a within-subject variable. Also, the object and scene descriptors were presented on a Soroc display terminal. On half of the trials (the primed trials), the subjects would read a descriptor of the scene along with the target name. They were given the IP instructions from Experiment 1 for use with the primes. On the other half of the trials, no scene descriptor was provided in that only the target name was displayed. Primed and unprimed trials were intermixed randomly, subject to the balancing described in Experiment 1. Across subjects, a given scene background was primed on half its presentations and unprimed On the other half. Responses were made by depression of one of two keys (labeled as they were in Experiment 1) on the terminal. After each response, feedback on accuracy and RT appeared on the terminal.
Results
Figures 8 and 9 show the error rates and mean correct RTs for Experiment 2.
Priming. As in Experiment 1, the effects of priming were not significant, F(l, 34) = .23, ns, for errors, and F(l, 34) = .67, ns, for RTs. Moreover, the primed trials were slower than the unprimed trials, an effect in the opposite direction to the (also nonsignificant) effect found in,Experiment 1.
It is possible that the beneficial effects of priming were limited to the base scenes. Thus, one might expect a normal kitchen rather than one with a violation if primed with kitchen, A facilitating effect of priming on the base scenes might have been balanced by an interference effect of priming on the violation scenes, eliminating an overall effect of priming. The data provide no support for this explanation. Table 2 shows the error rates separately for base and violation conditions in Experiments 1 and 2.
In Experiment 1, the Response (base vs. violation) X Priming interaction for the error rates was marginally significant, F(2, 69)'« 3.41, p < .05, but was in a direction opposite to that predicted; thus priming would be expected to facilitate base scenes more than violations. Moreover, most of the effect came from the VP group, where the error rates for judging base scenes were 6,2% higher than for the violation scenes. Differences in RTs fpr these variables were negligible: The Response X Priming interaction for RTs was nonsignificant, F(2, 69) = .63.
In Experiment 2, the overall Priming X Response (good vs. bad) interaction was not significant for either errors or RTs, F( 1,34) = .07 and .24, respectively.
When the violation conditions were analyzed individually, the error rates for the base and five violation conditions did differ as a function of priming in both Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 2 ). In both experiments there were significant Priming X Violation Condition interactions, F(10, 345) = 4.79, P < .001, in Experiment 1, and F(5, 110) = 5.54, p < .001, in Experiment 2: However, the pattern of these interactions was inconsistent across the two experiments. Thus, in Experiment 1, the two conditions that showed the largest advantage of IP over NP (the Size & Position and Size & Support double-violation conditions) showed the largest advantage of NP over IP in Experiment 2. The correlation of the six difference scores (NP -IP) across the two experiments was essentially 0 (r = -.097). The inconsistency in the pattern of the interactions across the two experiments makes it clear that neither a general facilitation effect on all the relations nor a reliable facilitation effect specific to some of the violation conditions (which might have been obscured by interference effects from other conditions) can be supported by these data.
The effect of the object name on priming. Was a real priming effect eliminated because the subjects were able to successfully infer the prime from the object name on the nonprimed trials? One way in which a priming effect might have been reduced (but not eliminated) was if the subjects were inferring the prime from the target object on those trials in which the target might have been predictive of the prime. For example, if the target no prime, NP -IP = no prime error rate minus imagery was blanket, the subject might have inferred that the background would be a bedroom. If the setting was a bedroom and if ability to infer the prime would facilitate performance as much as when the primes were actually presented, then no priming effect would be obtained for that scene. This could not have been a very large effect because many of the targets could have occurred in so many settings that accurate prediction would have been relatively rare. To evaluate this effect more precisely, three judges checked off those settings on a list of the 26 primes (two of the settings had the same label in the two parts of the experiment) that could have reasonably contained the target object. They did this for all 96 objects. The mean number of primes checked per object was 8.4. For example, the three judges rated newspaper as possibly occurring in 13.3 settings; man in 23.3 settings; cup in 15.7 settings; cow in 3.0 settings.
The raters were also required to list the three most likely settings to contain the target. As might be expected from the large number of possible settings for each object, these ratings were only moderately predictive of the actual scenes containing the target. In 87 of the 237 rated scene-target combinations, the scene actually containing the target was not included among the three most likely scenes (blanket occurred in picnic). However, to provide a further check on the possibility that the priming effect was reduced by predictability of the target to the prime, we partitioned those scenes that actually contained the target object into three categories depending on the rankings of the three raters. A prime-object pair was assigned a score of 3 if a rater judged that of the 26 prime labels, it would have been the one most likely to contain that object. Scores of 2 and 1 were assigned to the second and third choices, respectively. Zero was assigned to those slides that were not given a rating in the top three. The ratings of the three judges were summed so that if all three raters judged a slide as the one most likely to contain the cued object, it would have received a score of 9. A score of 5 could have resulted from one of the raters judging a given setting as most likely to contain the target (3), another rater judging it as second most likely (2), and the third rater judging it as not one of the top three for containing that object (0).
The three categories were (a) those scenes (n = 70) in which the target was highly predictive of the prime (scores of 6 to 9); (b) those (« = 92) in which the target was moderately predictive of the prime (scores of 1 to 5); and (c) those (n = 87) in which the target was poorly predictive of the prime (scores of 0).
If a true priming effect had been reduced by correct prediction of a prime from the object names, then the smallest priming effect (percentage of errors for the nonprimed condition minus the percentage of errors for the primed condition) should have occurred on those trials in which the object was highly predictive of the setting, and the largest priming effect should have been evidenced when the object name was least predictive. This did not occur. The priming effects were 1% for the poorly predictive group, -1% for the moderately predictive group, and 3% for the highly predictive group. These negligible differences are in a direction opposite to what would have been expected if the accurate prediction of a prime reduced the priming effect. The answer to the question posed at the heading of this section is no.
Repetition. Although the effects of repetition in this experiment were less apparent than they were in Experiment 1, they were significant, F(4, 136) = 11.20, p < .001, for errors, and ^(4, 136) = 5.66, p < .001, for RTs. As in Experiment 1, most of the learning transferred from the first to the second half, when the scene backgrounds were changed. There was no tendency for subjects to respond good with increasing repetitions of the settings, in that the Repetition X Response interaction was not significant, F(4, 136) = 1.28 and 1.81, for errors and RTs, respectively, in Experiment 1 and F(4, 88) = .28 and .44, for errors and RTs, respectively, in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3
In the target-verification task studied in this experiment, subjects attempted to detect not the presence of a violation but the cued object itself, which corresponded to the target label on only half the trials. In contrast to the violation-detection task of Experiments 1 and 2, the target-verification task in this experiment did not require that the background be processed. However, previous research (e.g., Biederman et al., 1982) as well as the present experiment, established a violation effect: Objects undergoing violations were more difficult to verify than objects in a base position. This finding indicates that an object's relations to its background affect its detectability, even though the relations are not required to perform the task.
There are two nonexclusive ways in which an increase in the perceptibility of the background through priming or repetition might reasonably be expected to affect object verification. First, less capacity might have to be allocated to the processing of the background. This would lead to an overall advantage for the verification of objects appearing in primed or familiar backgrounds because some of the capacity that would have been needed to process the background would be available for processing the object. An analogous effect in letter detection would be the higher detectability of a target letter when the distractor letters are in their normal, as compared with their inverted, orientations (Reicher, Snyder, & Richards, 1976) .
Second, if priming or familiarity serves to specify the normally expected relations among the objects in a given kind of setting, then priming or repetition should facilitate the identification of objects in normal relations to their setting and should interfere (or produce less facilitation) with the verification of objects undergoing violations. Many experiments support the generalization that better perception of a context increases the perceptibility of the components that are appropriate to it-relative to the components that are inconsistent with it. Thus, for example, the detectability of a letter increases as its word-forming context is presented earlier (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) ; the longer the sentence context, the greater the detectibility of an appropriate word and the lower the detectibility of an inappropriate word (Tulving & Gold, 1963) .
This experiment was designed to assess whether this interaction between the violation effect and priming or repetitions would occur (as well as whether an overall benefit from these variables could be produced). In Experiments 1 and 2, base objects were assigned to a different response than objects undergoing violations, so any interaction between priming and the object's relation to its context (base vs. violation) could have arisen from response factors. In the present experiment, each response (yes or no) was made to cued objects that included instances of both base and violation conditions so the interaction between priming and object condition could be assessed independent of possible response biases.
The logic of the inferences from this experiment was identical to that of Experiments 1 and 2. An overall benefit of priming or repetitions (or a facilitory effect confined to base objects) would not necessarily require that the effect be perceptual. However, the absence of an effect would indicate that perceptual facilitation (or any other kind of facilitation) did not occur. In Experiments 1 and 2, performance levels were largely maintained across the switch in scene backgrounds between the first and second halves of the experiment. These nonspecific transfer effects were interpreted as evidence that performance gains over the first five trials in the first half of these experiments were not due to familiarity with the specific scene backgrounds. However, it is possible that the appearance of the new scene backgrounds produced general facilitory effects. For example* subjects could have become more interested or motivated with new scenes and the attendant performance gains could have balanced performance losses attributable to the unfamiliarity of the new scenes. To evaluate this (unlikely) possibility, a subset of the scenes was present in both the first and the second halves of the experiment.
Method
Sixty-four subjects participated in the experiment. They were provided with the name of a target object and, on the priming trials, were also given a descriptor of the setting, as in Experiments 1 and 2. Imagery priming instructions were used. After the subject had read the target and, on primed trials, the scene descriptor, he or she would press a microswitch to start the presentation sequence. A central fixation point was then presented for 500 msec, followed by a 100-msec flash of the scene, which, in turn, was followed by a 500-msec cue (a dot embedded in a mask composed of object fragments), which marked a position in the scene where an object had been. Note that in this experiment (unlike the first two), objects were postcued.
On half the trials, the cue designated an object that was the target, and the subject was to press a key on the Soroc terminal marked YES. On the other half of the trials, the target was not in the scene and the cue designated another object. On those trials, the subject was to press a key marked NO. On half of the yes and half of the no trials, the cued object was in a normal (base) position in the scene. On the other half of the trials, the cued object was undergoing one of the five violations listed in Table 1 . On approximately 10% of the yes trials the target object was improbable in the scene. These were the trials in which the cued object was undergoing a Probability violation. So that subjects would not be able to infer a response from the improbability of a target and a scene prime, on 10% of the no trials the target objects were also improbable for their settings.
Stimuli and design. The experimental stimuli were 112 slides of scenes generated from 28 backgrounds plus 48 filler scenes. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the experimental scenes were partitioned into two equivalent sets, each generated from 14 backgrounds. Within each set, the 14 backgrounds were each presented four times. The 4 slides with the same background differed in that they contained different cued objects or that an object that had previously appeared in a base condition would be undergoing a violation. In addition to the experimental scenes, 6 additional backgrounds furnished filler scenes. These filler backgrounds were present in both halves of the experiment (thus, they were referred to as the constant set) to provide an indicant of any facilitative effect of the switch in scene backgrounds between the first to the second halves of the experiment trials. Within each half, these scenes were presented twice as frequently (i.e., eight times) as the experimental (switched) scenes. Therefore, by the end of the experiment, they had been presented on 16 trials, so their comparison with the four exposures of the experimental scenes provided another test of the effects of repetition. A1L64 subjects viewed all 208 scenes. (See Biederman et aU 1982, for additional details of the procedure and stimulus specifications.)
Results
Repetition. Figures 10 and 11 show the error rates and mean correct RTs as a function of exposures and priming condition. Although there was considerable variability across the unprimed trial blocks, learning did occur as evidenced by a significant decline in both RTs, F(3, 189) =11.38, p < .001, and errors, F(3, 189) = 9.26, p < .001, with exposures of the backgrounds. However, little of this learning could be attributable to faster or better accessing of the specific scene backgrounds because the reduction in RTs and errors that occurred over the four exposures in the first half of the experiment showed almost complete transfer to the second half. (The slight increase in error rates across the critical transfer block on the primed trials was also present in the constant set.)
The backgrounds to the filler scenes were included in both the first and second halves of the experiment to evaluate the possibility that the lack of an increase in RTs or errors between the first and the second half of the experiment for the experimental scenes was due to facilitation that might have occurred when the new set of scenes was introduced. Figures 12 and 13 show the learning and transfer effects for the filler scenes (the constant set) and the experimental scenes (the switched set). It is clear, from Figures 12 and  13 , that the transfer between first and second sets for the switched set was virtually identical to the transfer with the constant set.
The consistent difference favoring the constant set merely means that they were easier to process: Their advantage was present on the first trial block. Even though the backgrounds in the constant set were repeated twice as frequently in each block as the switched scenes and were carried over into the second half of the experiment, their advantage did not noticeably increase with the additional exposures. On the first block of the second half, in which the switched settings were shown for the first time, the constant settings were being shown for the ninth time.
Yet the difference between the two sets is as large as on the first trial block of the first half of the experiment, when the backgrounds of the constant set were only shown twice (and the switched scenes once). This is another piece of evidence that the perceptual processing of these scenes was not facilitated by their repetitions. The scenes were processed to a semantic level, as evidenced by interference effects from violating semantic relations (viz., Position, Size, and Probability). (Although a given object might be missed, the general setting could readily be described on each presentation). Targets undergoing violations were missed at a significantly higher rate than tar- gets in a base condition, 36.7% to 31.4%, respectively, F( 1,63) = 21.09, p < .001. (There was no effect on RTs, F[l, 63] = .15.) That is, these scenes were processed to a semantic level but did not leave a residue that could influence performance on a subsequent trial. The effect of the violations was constant over trials; the F ratio for the interaction between repetitions and the effect of violations was .25 for errors and .45 for RTs.
Priming. As shown in Figures 10 and 11 , there was no beneficial effect of priming. In fact, priming significantly increased error rates, F(l, 63) = 8.15, p < .01. The effect of priming on RTs was not significant, F(\, 63)= .16. Figure 14 shows the effects of priming on the miss and false-alarm rates for the base and five violation conditions. Contrary to what would be expected if priming were facilitating only base objects, the interference effect from priming was at least as large for base objects as it was for any of the violation conditions.
Especially prominent in the data shown in Figure 14 are the results from the Probability violation. In contrast to the other conditions, subjects were less likely to false alarm to cued objects that were improbable in a particular setting when those settings were primed. The departure of the Probability violations from the other conditions led to a significant triple interaction between Priming X Violation Condition X Response Type, ^(5, 315) = 8.34, p < .001. The simplest explanation for this interaction is that the improbability of the target on the primed trials produced a bias to respond no. This response bias to improbable objects has been observed in other experiments (Biederman, Glass, & Stacy, 1973; Biederman et al., 1982) .
General Discussion
In none of these experiments was a reliable beneficial effect of priming obtained. Across the three experiments, primed trials averaged less than .1% fewer errors than unprimed trials. This result suggests that activation of the most generic levels of a schema for a class of settings cannot facilitate perception of an instantiation of that class. Although the primes were inadequate activators of useful schematic information, schemata for these scenes were activated nonetheless, as evidenced by above-chance performance in Experiments 1 and 2 in detecting semantic violations and by an effect of the violations of semantic relations in Experiment 3 on object verification. Even though these scenes were processed to a semantic level, they did not leave a residue that could influence perception on a subsequent trial.
Thus, the picture of scene perception that emerges from these results differs from the one sketched by Minsky (1975) , described in the introduction. Perceptual benefit does not, and perhaps cannot, accrue from the prior specification of the top levels of a frame for a nondegraded representational picture of a scene. There is an infinity of possible visual configurations that could be termed kitchen. The literature on the effects of "set" (or priming) on perception suggests that unless the prime manages to specify some of the specific contours that will be present in the scene, there will be no benefit from such a prime. Lawrence and Coles (1954) were among the first to explore how set might affect picture perception when there was rigorous control for response factors. Their subjects attempted to recognize a picture of an object viewed tachistoscopically. Responses were made by selecting the label, from a set of four labels, that named the object. The major variables in the experiment were the order of presentation of the response alternatives (before vs. after the picture) and the similarity of the alternatives (similar vs. dissimilar). A set of four similar alternatives might be church, school, barn, house. Four dissimilar alternatives might be house, ball, fork, tree. If we interpret the presentation of the alternatives prior to the viewing of the'object as a priming condition, then that experiment can be examined for evidence of facilitation through a verbal prime. None was found.
Priming and Perceptual Set
(The more elaborate test of whether order of presentation would interact with similarity, to determine whether there was a perceptual effect of prior presentation of the alternatives, could not, therefore, be assessed.)
Thirteen years later, Egeth and Smith (1967) denned the critical conditions under which perceptual priming effects could be obtained. These investigators used not words as the response alternatives, but pictures. Not only was an advantage obtained for presenting the alternatives prior to the viewing of the object, but the sought-after interaction between similarity and time of presentation of the alternatives was found. Specifically, it was when the alternatives were similar that there was a large benefit from prior presentation of the response alternatives. If one were to distinguish among a church, school, barn, or bourse, then knowing where to look and what critical contours to look for would be of the utmost importance. With dissimilar alternatives, virtually any contours that were extracted during the viewing of the object would be sufficiently diagnostic for the correct response, so less benefit from prior specification of the alternatives (i.e., priming) would be expected.
The finding that priming affects only the prototypical members of basic-level categories (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & BoyesBraem, 1976 ) is entirely consistent with this point. If the prime fruit makes one think of the visual features possessed by an apple, then the identification of an apple might be facilitated by such a prime. But only if the apple is a good one. A bad apple, one in which the contours have been changed by several large bites, should not benefit as much, if at all, from the prime fruit (Coe & Preston, Note 1) .
Picture priming. We are concerned more with whether general expectations for a given kind of setting facilitate performance with scenes that appear normal than we are with an analysis of priming effect per se. However, it is of some interest to explore the conditions under which facilitative effects of scene priming might be found. According to the previous account of perceptual set, if a scene is primed with & picture of its background, then the specification of the contours might be expected to facilitate performance. Teitelbaum and Biederman (1979) reported that indeed there was a facilitation of performance in a violation-detection task in which the background of the experimental scene was shown before the trial (where the background and the target object were shown). Admittedly, it is not obvious that the presentation of the scene background should be termed priming, but it does serve to define the limits of priming effects-or their absence. It is also not clear that the facilitation in that experiment was on perception, rather than on subsequent inference. This last point is examined in the discussion of memory effects.
The preceding interpretation of the efficacy of picture priming is reinforced by the results of experiments showing better pictureidentification performance when the target was specified by its picture compared with when it was specified only by verbal label. Thus Pachella (1975) found lower objectidentification thresholds, and Potter (1976) reported improved detection of pictures in a rapidly presented sequence of pictures when the target was specified by its picture compared with its name. (In the 1976 report she questioned the validity of her earlier, 1975 failure to find a significant advantage of picture targets.) Potter (1976) used both scene and object targets, but the data were not reported separately for these two types of stimuli. By the present account, scenes should reveal a larger benefit from picture priming (as compared with verbal priming) in that the contours of scenes are typically less predictable from a verbal prime than the contours of objects.
Verbal priming and degraded scenes. The absence of a facilitation effect from verbal priming of scenes that appear normal does not preclude finding verbal priming effects under other conditions, such as when a scene was so degraded or was shown from such an unusual viewing angle or distance that its contours were insufficient to access its representation. Leeper (1935) reported that subjects were able to benefit from a verbal clue, for example, a "musical instrument," when attempting to identify highly degraded pictures of objects (see Neisser, 1967, p. 60 , for examples of Leeper's stimuli). It is possible to construct scenes that are analogues to Leeper's stimuli, in that the deletion of informative contours renders them extremely difficult to identify (Biederman, 1981, Figure 8.25) . The identification of these stimuli also benefits from a verbal prime. Sunday newspaper supplements often include puzzle pictures in which the reader is invited to identify an extreme, close-up picture of a common object or one that has been photographed from an unusual angle, such as a worm's-eye view of a fire hydrant. Certainly, the impression is that the answers do facilitate access to the object's perceptual identity when the initial attempts at identification fail. Perhaps the clearest cases are provided by "droodles," cartoon drawings of a part of a scene. Much of the humorous effect depends on an initial failure to identify the scene, which is then solved by the verbal descriptor.
Imagery prime interference? The absence of verbal priming facilitation in these experiments raises the possibility that the specific IP instructions used in Experiments 2 and 3 (viz., "try to imagine what such a scene might look like") might have led to interfererice from inappropriate imagery, which balanced out facilitation from the information in the prime. The higher error rates on the priming trials on the first few presentations of a scene background in Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that some interference might have been present in these experiments. Presumably, the subjects were learning to ignore the prime (or not to form images) over the first few scene presentations. Additional research would be required to assess whether any such balancing out of facilitation and interference effects actually did occur in these experiments. At best, the first few scene presentations merely brought error rates and RTs in line with the nonprimed trials. Whether additional training would have brought still further gains for the primed trials remains to be determined, although the implications of such a result would not be obvious, as discussed in the next section under memory. Additional research would also be required to determine whether the interference (if it is a reliable effect-it was riot evident in Experiment 1) was actually due to inappropriate imagery rather than an engagement of the processing mechanisms with a strategy that was less efficient than our normal mechanisms for scene perception. It is our belief that subjects were not actually forming images with the IP instructions. No practice or detailed instructions on forming images were undertaken, nor did the subjects in IP groups or on IP trials take noticeably more time on these self-paced tasks. Instead, it is possible that the IP instructions ("take a moment to imagine what such a scene; described by the label might look like") were interpreted as a mild exhortation to think about the scene descriptor.
Memory
There was no benefit of the prior repetition of specific scene backgrounds in these experiments. This does not mean that there was no memory of these scenes. Under the conditions of this experiment (viz., no requirement to process a subsequent picture; Intraub, 1979 Intraub, , 1980 Potter, 1975 Potter, , 1976 , had we asked the subjects to perform a recognition test of old versus new, there is ample evidence that their accuracy would be very higfi (Antes, 1977; Loftus, 1972) . Subjectively, the scenes can be clearly seen from a single exposure, and their repetition was readily recognizable on their subsequent exposures. But we did not test whether scenes looked familiar, only whether scene memory could be accessed so as to; influence subsequent perception. It could not.
The results from the present experiment should be distinguished from those showing that under some conditions in which a series of pictures is rapjdly presented, the detection of target pictures can be reasonably accurate but recognition memory can be relatively poor (Intraub, 1979 (Intraub, , 1980 Potter, 1975 Potter, , 1976 . For example, Potter (1976, Experiment 1) reported that when a sequence of 16 pictures was presented at a rate of 113 msec per picture, subjects were able to detect tar* gets (specified by name) in approximately 62% of the sequences but were able to recognize only about 12%. (corrected for guessing) of the pictures in the sequence on a subsequent test. If recognition memory is poor, then one would not expect the backgrounds to facilitate perception. The critical variable producing poor memory in Potter's and Intraub's experiments was the requirement to process the subsequent picture (Intraub, 1980) , not visual masking or the rapid rates of presentation. The present experiment demonstrated that under conditions in which recognition memory would be expected to be high, this memory was insufficient to affect the perceptual processing of the background when it was presented on a later trial.
The absence of a benefit from three or four prior repetitions of a scene on its subsequent perception raises the question as to whether more or longer exposure durations (or exposures made immediately prior to the test trial) would have resulted in a more usable memory for the perception of a scene's background. The answer to this question might not be as obvious as it first appears. Although one could readily carry out the appropriate operations (by increasing the number, duration, or recency of exposures of a scene's background), the disentanglement of perceptual effects from inferential effects subsequent to perception will require paradigms that do more than simply measure the accuracy of identifying objects that have been previously present in the scene. Consideration of an extreme case of familiarity adapted from a procedure devised by Attneave (Attneave & Pierce, 1978) will make this point clear. Imagine that you are standing, blindfolded, with your back toward your refrigerator door in your own kitchen (or in some other familiar spot in a familiar room). From such a position, you could readily locate and identify, by pointing, drawing, or naming, many of the objects and surfaces that would be present in actual view. That is, we can remember, to some extent, what our kitchens look like. But the issue under consideration is not whether we can remember such a scene but whether memory is useful for our perception. Thus, we would likely be more accurate than someone who was unfamiliar with pur kitchen if the object-detection task used in Experiment 3 was done with a picture of our own kitchen. We would be able to detect more accurately the target sink when that area of our kitchen was cued compared with an individual who had never seen our kitchen. (Or, with the violation-detection tasks of Experiments 1 and 2, we might be able to detect more readily a Position violation when a toaster is positioned in the sink.) But we would likely be above chance even if the scene was never presented. Just from memory we can point with a fair degree of accuracy to relevant areas occupied by the sink, stove, table, and so forth. So such performance by itself does not mean that perception is facilitated by familiarity. The same caveat must be voiced about the background priming effects reported by Teitelbaum and Biederman (1979) . The experimental tests for the existence of perceptual effects from priming or repetitions are asymmetrical. The failure to find facilitation effects means that these operations did not facilitate perception. However, if facilitation effects were found, as was discussed previously, their locus in a sequence of information-processing operations would have to be determined.
The Probability Paradox
When we consider how easily and rapidly probabilistic relations can be accessed, the absence of a priming effect appears paradoxical. If violation of the Probability relation interferes with an object's perceptibility (Biederman et al., 1982) , should not a verbal prime, which accurately provides a probabilistic relation, facilitate an object's perceptibility?
Resolution of the paradox is relatively straightforward and was alluded to earlier.
Given that we are looking at a scene, we have direct and ready access to its overall representation; for example, we know that we are looking at a kitchen. However, given that we are told that we will see a kitchen, we do not know what the particular visual configura-tion will be: There is an infinite number of configurations that could be termed kitchen. So, it is easy to get to the top (the label kitchen) from the bottom (a visual configuration), but it is not so easy to go the other way: to go from kitchen to the visual configuration that is a particular kitchen. Yet, as described above, we readily observe top-down effects in the form of effects of violations of Probability, in the perception of objects and scenes.
3 What this implies is that these topdown effects do not come into play until some visual information is available. What interfered with processing in the Bruner and Potter (1964) experiment was not so much that an incorrect abstract hypothesis about the scene had been elicited but that visual areas of the scene had been misidentified:
An incorrect interpretation of the picture may occur either in the primary flgural organization of the picture (for example, an inhomogeneity is seen as concave, whereas it is convex in the full picture when correctly identified), or in the assignment of identity to a visual organization (the convexity is recognized, but it is seen as a pile of earth rather than correctly, say, as a dish of chocolate ice cream). (Bruner & Potter, 1964, p. 425) By the present account, a misleading verbal prime should not have an interfering effect, just as an accurate verbal prime did not facilitate perception. Penland (1979) has recently determined that misleading verbal primes, in fact, do not disrupt scene perception.
Conclusions
Neither priming a subject with a verbal descriptor of a setting nor providing three or four prior exposures of a setting reliably or consistently improved the accessing of semantic information from a scene with that setting. These results stand in contrast to conceptions of scene perception positing the utility of prior instantiation of the molar levels of frames for scenes. Such conceptions predict that the advance specification of the general setting of an object should facilitate the processing of that object.
These results are consistent with the literature on the effects of set on picture perception suggesting that the mechanisms for perceiving and interpreting a real-world scene require specific contours for their activation.
The present results, along with film-editing practice and experiments documenting rapid comprehension of a scene from a single glance, imply that with a representative nondegraded scene as an input, the mechanisms for scene perception are so quick and efficient that conditions can readily be found in which expectancy and familiarity are neither necessary nor even helpful.
3 In Experiment 3, as well as in the Biederman et al. (1982) experiment, objects undergoing violations were less accurately detected than objects in a normal position. Not only does probabilistic information affect object perceptibility, but it also has been shown to readily affect the probability of fixation (Loftus & Bell, 1975; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978) , the duration of the first fixation (Friedman, 1979) , the biasing of response choices from ambiguous objects (Palmer, 1975) , and the quick exiting from a scene when a target is improbable (Biederman et al., 1973) . This well-documented sensitivity of visual information processing to probabilistic relations underscores the paradoxical nature of the lack of an effect of priming.
